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JOHN RAPPAPORT

THE STRUCTURAL FUNCTION OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE

The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the accused,” “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions,” “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”1 The
right to court-appointed, publicly funded counsel this language calls
to mind today is a recent invention.2 The “root meaning” of the Sixth
Amendment’s Counsel Clause, the Supreme Court has stressed—
the one with ties to the founding tradition—is the right to retain
counsel of one’s choice.3 Yet until just last Term, no criminal defendant had ever persuaded the Court to reverse a conviction solely
on counsel-of-choice grounds; many had tried in vain. I consider in
this article whether there is any satisfying, functional account that
can explain the disjuncture between what the Court says about the
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right to counsel of choice and what it does when presented with an
asserted violation of that right.
The leading academic and judicial theories justify the right to
counsel of choice either as securing the effective assistance of counsel, and thus a fair trial, or as a facet of the defendant’s prerogative
to control his own defense. These theories, however—grounded in
majestic-sounding notions of fairness and autonomy, respectively—
struggle to explain counsel-of-choice doctrine. For one thing, indigent
defendants—who number more than four out of every ﬁve—simply
have no right to choose their counsel at all. And while criminal procedure rights are seldom absolute, balancing the defendant’s fairness and autonomy interests against the government’s countervailing
needs cannot explain the pattern of Court decisions in anything but
the most ad hoc manner. Seemingly unremarkable governmental interests prevail while a stronger one faltered this past Term.
My claim is that something very different makes sense of the Supreme Court’s counsel-of-choice decisions. The failure of the leading theories, therefore, does not condemn the doctrine to incoherence. The right to counsel of choice, I argue, functions not as a
powerful individual entitlement, as much of the judicial and scholarly
writing suggests, but rather as a weak, system-level safeguard against
socialization of the criminal defense bar. I use “socialization” here
to refer to “the action or process of bringing” an institution “under
state ownership or public control”—that is, not in the sense of social
psychology but rather the political theory of socialism.4 Only when
the government advances a theory for restraining defendant choice
that, if accepted, would allow it to strangle the private defense bar and
socialize criminal defense does this antisocialization principle require
that the right to counsel of choice prevail. This means that even a weak
governmental interest—like a judge’s desire to push a case to trial
quickly—can overcome the right as long as that interest is meaningfully bounded in its reach across the criminal docket. But it also means
that a law requiring all defendants to use court-appointed counsel—
mandating a socialized defense bar—would violate the Sixth Amendment despite its equality-promoting effects.
An antisocialization principle explains, in particular—far better
than a theory grounded in individual fairness or autonomy—last
4
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 3d ed 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/Q2LJ
-UESL.
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Term’s counsel-of-choice decision, Luis v United States,5 in which
the Court for the ﬁrst time found a stand-alone counsel-of-choice
violation. The defendant in Luis was charged with health care fraud
of around $45 million, almost all of which she had already spent.
Seeking to preserve the $2 million remaining in the defendant’s possession, which would be necessary to pay restitution and criminal
penalties if the defendant were convicted, the government obtained a
pretrial order prohibiting the defendant from dissipating her assets.
This included the defendant’s “untainted” assets—assets not traceable to her alleged crimes—which the defendant wished to spend to
mount her criminal defense.6
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a fractured Supreme Court held that the trial court’s order violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Justice Breyer
announced the Court’s judgment in a four-Justice plurality opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, resting on a textual and historical analysis. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito,
dissented, ﬁnding the case indistinguishable from precedent that had
rebuffed similar counsel-of-choice claims. Justice Kagan also dissented, questioning whether that same precedent had been correctly
decided.
An antisocialization theory—but neither fairness nor autonomy—
cogently distinguishes Luis from all of the cases in which the Court
rejected counsel-of-choice claims. That includes the two famous and
closely related precedents the Justices in the majority strained to
differentiate in Luis,7 ultimately relying on unpersuasive statutory and
historical formalisms that I will examine. Antisocialization can also
begin to explain (though not necessarily justify) the complete denial
of the counsel-of-choice right to indigent criminal defendants, a
disquieting feature of the doctrine in light of equal-protection principles.
I explore these issues below. Part I introduces the leading theories courts and commentators have developed to justify the right to
counsel of choice. It then exposes the inability of these theories to
5

136 S Ct 1083 (2016).

6

Id at 1087–88 (Breyer, J) (plurality).

7

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617 (1989); United States v Monsanto,
491 US 600 (1989).
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explain the doctrine. Part II demonstrates how an antisocialization
theory better describes the law. In the tradition of criminal procedure
scholarship seeking theories that reconcile the Court’s decisions,8 I
do not argue that antisocialization ought to drive the doctrine; my
project is positive, not normative. I seek to explain the law, not to
justify it. Nevertheless, I do develop in Part II a plausible normative
defense for the antisocialization theory in order to bolster my descriptive claim. The defense is sufﬁcient to persuade me that Luis
was correctly decided. Were I to craft my own justiﬁcation for the
counsel-of-choice right, however, it might well be markedly more
robust.
My argument is not that antisocialization is the only fathomable
theory that explains the doctrine. It is possible, for example, that
counsel-of-choice doctrine tracks historical understandings of the
right. Yet neither the Justices nor commentators have shown this to
be generally true, leaving the burden of proof, for the time being, on
the historical theory’s would-be proponents. I am skeptical, though, I
will add, that a historical theory would be as useful as the functional
theory I explicate here, confronting, as it must, the familiar problem
of what to do when formal materials (i.e., historical understandings)
run out.9
In Part III, in lieu of a traditional conclusion, I step outside the
Sixth Amendment to critique counsel-of-choice doctrine from an external perspective. The doctrine itself is young and undertheorized,
and much remains to be worked out in due course. But regardless of
how the Court resolves any outstanding Sixth Amendment questions, I argue in Part III that several of its counsel-of-choice precedents may run aground on other, settled constitutional protections.
These are conﬂicts the Court should consider alongside Sixth Amendment principles as it continues to elaborate the right to counsel of
choice.
8
See, for example, William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 Colum L Rev 1227,
1231–32 (1988) (arguing that “a great deal of the doctrine is consistent with what the Justices
would have done had they . . . viewed the privilege” against self-incrimination in light of the
author’s excuse theory); Peter Westen and Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 Supreme Court Review 81, 155 (offering a descriptive theory of doublejeopardy law and arguing that “[t]he measure of a theory is its usefulness in explaining the
data—in this case the decisions of the Supreme Court”).
9
See Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 BU L Rev 1745,
1761 (2015) (acknowledging, as an originalist, that “[w]hen history runs out, we have to use
other methods of interpretation”).
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I. Difﬁculties with the Leading Descriptive Theories
Two principal theories—what I call fairness and autonomy—
dominate judicial and scholarly thinking on the right to counsel of
choice. Yet however well these theories might justify the right as a
philosophical matter, they cannot explain counsel-of-choice doctrine.
In this part, I describe the fairness and autonomy theories and illustrate the limits of their descriptive power. In particular, I show how
these theories are unable cogently to distinguish Luis, in which the
Court found a stand-alone violation of the defendant’s right to
counsel of choice, from the many cases in which it did not.10
a. fairness
Probably the most popular theory of counsel of choice describes
the right as helping the defendant secure a fair trial. This fairness
theory is outcome-oriented and instrumental—it regards the right as
a means to the ultimate end of fair adjudication in an adversary system. Perhaps more precisely, the fairness theory views the right to
counsel of choice as securing the right to effective assistance of
counsel, which itself ensures a fair adjudicatory process.
The plurality opinion in Luis (to the extent it is theorized at all)
seems to rest upon this understanding. Although it acknowledges that
the entitlement at stake is that to “counsel of choice,” the plurality
elides that right with the more “fundamental” right to counsel itself,
without which the defendant, “though he be not guilty, . . . faces the

10
There are several well-known decisions my analysis does not cover. In Gonzalez-Lopez v
United States, 548 US 140 (2006), the case in which the Court ﬁrst called the right to counsel
of choice the “root meaning” of the Counsel Clause, the government had conceded a
counsel-of-choice violation; the Court did not consider whether one had occurred. Id at 144.
There are also two cases in which the Court is sometimes said to have found a violation of the
right to counsel of choice, but which in fact involved deprivation of the right to counsel itself.
See Glasser v United States, 315 US 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the trial court had denied the
defendant “his right to have the effective assistance of counsel” by appointing the defendant’s
attorney to represent another defendant simultaneously); Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 58
(1932) (holding that defendants charged with rape “were not accorded the right of counsel in
any substantial sense”). On Powell, see also United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 660–61 (1984)
(characterizing Powell as a case in which “the likelihood that counsel could have performed as
an effective adversary was so remote as to have made the trial inherently unfair”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 299, 376 (Basic, 1993) (describing the rape charge as “a complete fabrication” and the trial as “a scandal . . . thick with
race prejudice” and asserting that “the defendants, practically speaking, had no help at all
from their lawyers”); Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44
San Diego L Rev 525, 529 (2007) (“Powell was not a case about right to counsel of choice.”).
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danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.”11 Elsewhere the Court has “recognized that the purpose
of providing assistance of counsel ‘is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial,’” and thus, “while the right to select
and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by
the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant.”12
There is a related position, which is sometimes portrayed as independent from the fairness theory, but which seems to me sufﬁciently related to warrant common treatment. That view regards the
right to counsel of choice as facilitating a “meaningful relationship”
between counsel and her client. The idea is that a criminal defendant
will place greater trust in, and form a better relationship with, a
lawyer he has selected rather than one the court has thrust upon
him.13 Upon inspection, however, most formulations of the “meaningful relationship” position are grounded in the belief that a better
attorney-client relationship will enable a stronger defense.14 The
relationship is typically not thought to be valuable in its own right.
Some argue that good attorney-client relationships help legitimize
case outcomes—that defendants will accept their fate more readily
if they believe they received zealous representation from counsel they
11
Luis, 136 S Ct at 1088–89 (Breyer, J) (plurality) (quotation mark omitted), quoting Gideon
v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 345 (1963), quoting Powell, 287 US at 69.
12
Wheat v United States, 486 US 153, 159 (1988), quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 689 (1984). See also, for example, Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
“Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 Iowa L Rev 433, 441 (1993) (“The right to choose
counsel promotes the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings. . . .”).
13
See, for example, Luis, 136 S Ct at 1089 (Breyer, J) (plurality); Green, 78 Iowa L Rev at
441 (cited in note 12); Hoeffel, 44 San Diego L Rev at 527, 542 (cited in note 10); Wayne D.
Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement
Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 Brooklyn L Rev
181, 187–88, 207 (1998); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees Under RICO and CCE
and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U Miami
L Rev 765, 802 (1989).
14
See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 645 (1989)
(Blackmun, J, dissenting) (referring to “the trust between attorney and client that is necessary
for the attorney to be a truly effective advocate”); Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1, 21 (1983)
(Brennan, J, concurring in result) (asserting that “crucial decisions” of trial strategy “can best
be made, and counsel’s duties most effectively discharged, if the attorney and the defendant
have a relationship characterized by trust and conﬁdence”); Alfredo Garcia, The Right to
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 Am Crim L Rev 35, 95 (1991) (“An
inextricable link exists between the conﬁdence and trust a criminal defendant has in his
lawyer and the effectiveness of the defense attorney.”); Hoeffel, 44 San Diego L Rev at 541
(cited in note 10); Holly, 64 Brooklyn L Rev at 188 (cited in note 13); Winick, 43 U Miami L
Rev at 802–04 (cited in note 13).
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selected.15 To the extent the outcomes being legitimized are substantively fair, this seems reasonable to me, though not meaningfully distinct from the fairness theory itself. To the extent that unfair
outcomes will appear legitimate, it is far less clear that this plausibly
justiﬁes the right.
b. autonomy
A second strand of legal thought—absent in Luis—maintains that
the right to counsel of choice has intrinsic value as an aspect of the
criminal defendant’s individual autonomy and control over his own
defense. Unlike the fairness theory, this autonomy theory is not
outcome-oriented; it does not depend on an assumption or prediction
about how counsel will affect the fairness or result of the defendant’s
proceedings. The right to counsel of choice, on this view, is valuable
for its own sake, not because of the results it’s thought to produce.16
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez-Lopez v United States17
exempliﬁes the autonomy position. The Sixth Amendment “commands,” the Court admonished in Gonzalez-Lopez, “not that a trial be
fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit,
that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”18
This “right to select counsel of one’s choice,” the Court continued,
“has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of
ensuring a fair trial” and should not be confused with the “right to
effective counsel.”19 It “reﬂects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.”20
15
See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 645 (Blackmun, J, dissenting) (“[T]he
defendant’s perception of the fairness of the process, and his willingness to acquiesce in its
results, depend upon his conﬁdence in his counsel’s dedication, loyalty, and ability.”); Garcia,
29 Am Crim L Rev at 96–97 (cited in note 14); Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 802 (cited in
note 13).
16
For a thorough normative defense of the criminal defendant’s autonomy interest, see
Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case,
90 BU L Rev 1147 (2010). For a skeptical take, see Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of
Defendant Autonomy, 83 NC L Rev 621 (2005).
17

548 US 140 (2006).

18

Id at 146.
Id at 147, 148.

19

20
Flanagan v United States, 465 US 259, 268 (1984). Of course, some jurists subscribe to
both the fairness and autonomy views. See, for example, Wheat, 486 US at 165–66 (Marshall, J, dissenting) (arguing that “a primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to grant a
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Much scholarly commentary on the right to counsel of choice accords with this view, agreeing that “the most important decision a
defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.”21 The attorney acts, among other things, as conduit for the defendant’s “communicative activity in the public forum of the courtroom”; respect for the defendant’s choice of counsel is thus “‘respect
for the individual’” himself.22 One commentator, analogizing to the
right to self-representation, aptly quoted the Court’s sharp language
from that context: “An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant
only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal ﬁction. Unless the
accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented
is not the defense guaranteed by the Constitution, for, in a very real
sense, it is not his defense.”23

c. the theories’ descriptive shortcomings
The fairness and autonomy theories for the right to counsel of
choice are perfectly lucid as a philosophical matter. What they lack,
however, is any real explanatory power. If the theories did explain
the doctrine, they would be able to distinguish Luis, in which the
Court found a counsel-of-choice violation, from the many cases in
which it did not. Yet as I show in this section, neither theory is up to
this task. Speciﬁcally, neither theory is able persuasively to differ-

criminal defendant effective control over the conduct of his defense” because “‘it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails,’” but also that “lodging the selection of counsel
with the defendant generally will promote the fairness and integrity of criminal trials”), quoting Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819–20 (1975).
21
Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 803 (cited in note 13), quoting United States v Laura, 607
F2d 52, 56 (3d Cir 1979); Holly, 64 Brooklyn L Rev at 189 (cited in note 13).
22
Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 803 (cited in note 13), quoting Wilson v Mintzes, 761 F2d
275, 286 (6th Cir 1985). Public defense reformers, by developing a “client-centered” model
of representation, have worked to effectuate defendant autonomy even when defendants cannot choose their counsel. See, for example, Robin Steinberg and David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s Ofﬁce, 29 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 123 (2004).
23
Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 804 (cited in note 13) (quotation marks omitted), quoting
Faretta, 422 US at 821. For additional academic commentary supporting the autonomy
theory, see Garcia, 29 Am Crim L Rev at 92–98 (cited in note 14); Green, 78 Iowa L Rev at
442 (cited in note 12); Hoeffel, 44 San Diego L Rev at 543– 44 (cited in note 10); Eugene L.
Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 SC L Rev 345, 385 (1992); Note, Rethinking the Boundaries of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Choice of Counsel, 124 Harv L Rev 1550, 1571 (2011).
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entiate Luis from three sets of counsel-of-choice precedents that
capture most, if not all, of the Supreme Court’s work in this domain: (1) cases involving the inherent powers of the trial court to
control litigation; (2) fee-forfeiture cases involving “tainted” (rather
than “untainted”) assets; and (3) cases involving indigent criminal
defendants.
1. Inherent powers. Mundane decisions courts make in the course
of criminal litigation, or even antecedent choices regarding judicial
administration, can have the effect of denying a criminal defendant
his ﬁrst-choice aide. Consider three examples. In one case, the court
denies a midtrial continuance necessary to accommodate the desired
attorney’s schedule. In another, it prohibits counsel from representing the defendant alongside two of his codefendants, notwithstanding conﬂict-of-interest waivers from all of the defendants concerned. And in the third, it simply enforces court rules barring practice
by nonlawyers, disbarred lawyers, and lawyers from out of state.
In none of these cases, the Court has said, does the trial court violate the defendant’s right to counsel of choice.24 But the trial court’s
actions in each instance certainly implicate the defendant’s fairness
and autonomy interests. The defendant who was denied a continuance, for example, argued that the lawyer assigned to him had not
zealously represented his interests.25 Disagreeing, the Court denied
his claim and expressly rejected the lower court’s position, rooted in
the fairness theory, that the right to counsel of choice safeguards
a “meaningful relationship” between the defendant and his attorney.26 Likewise, deciding to roll the dice with a lay representative27 or

24
See Wheat, 486 US at 159 (conﬂict of interest); Slappy, 461 US at 13 (continuance); Note,
124 Harv L Rev at 1554 (cited in note 23) (“No Supreme Court case has turned directly on
the question of whether choice of counsel may be limited entirely to current members of the
bar, but the Court has clearly asserted this much in dicta.”). But see, for example, United
States v Whitesel, 543 F2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir 1976) (rejecting strict equation of “counsel”
with “attorneys at law”).
25
26

Slappy, 461 US at 8.
Id at 13–14.

27
See, for example, Green, 78 Iowa L Rev at 470–71 (cited in note 12); Mindy D. Block,
Comment, The Criminal Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Lay Representation, 52 U Chi L
Rev 460, 470 (1985). See also Faretta, 422 US at 820 n 16 (observing that “[t]he ﬁrst lawyers were personal friends of the litigant, brought into court by him so that he might ‘take
“counsel” with them’ before pleading,” and “the ﬁrst ‘attorneys’ were personal agents, often
lacking any professional training”), quoting Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 1 The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 211 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1898).
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one subject to a potential conﬂict of interest28 would seem to fall
squarely within the autonomy-premised right to control one’s defense. This is the same interest, notably, that supports the right to
self-representation, which requires the trial court to let an uneducated defendant represent himself.29 At the very least, these outcomes
are difﬁcult to reconcile with the type of robust individual protection the Court’s “root meaning” language implies.
Of course, observing that the right fails in some cases to protect
the defendant’s interests—whether rooted in fairness or autonomy—
may suggest nothing more than that those interests were outweighed by the government’s countervailing needs through a process of interest-balancing. Yet if counsel-of-choice doctrine reﬂects
a weighing of fairness or autonomy interests, on the one hand, and
government need, on the other, we would expect the government
to prevail when it matters most and lose when it matters least—especially as the defendants’ interests seem roughly equivalent across
the cases.30
The doctrine does not line up this way, however. This is a point
that was harder to see before Luis, because the government’s interests
had prevailed in every case. That they fell short in Luis suggests—
if the doctrine indeed reﬂects a balance of the defendant’s fairness
or autonomy interests against state prerogatives—that the government interest in Luis was weaker than in all the prior cases. But that is
a difﬁcult position to maintain. In the earlier cases, the government
won by asserting interests such as the “great deal of latitude” necessary “in scheduling trials,”31 the desire to ensure that “legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them,”32 and “the legitimate
wish of district courts that their judgments remain intact on appeal.”33 In Luis, it had what the Court has elsewhere characterized as
a “strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all for28
See Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum L Rev 1201, 1233–38 (1989) (criticizing the Court’s
conﬂict-of-interest precedent on autonomy grounds).
29
Faretta, 422 US at 833.
30
See Stuntz, 88 Colum L Rev at 1236 (cited in note 8) (making the point for selfincrimination doctrine).
31
Slappy, 461 US at 11.
32
33

Wheat, 486 US at 160.

Id at 161. See Green, 89 Colum L Rev at 1239–48 (cited in note 28) (arguing that the
Court’s reliance on the institutional interests of the judiciary is misguided).
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feitable assets,”34 which aims to punish and deter serious crimes.35
If there is a theory as to why that “strong governmental interest” is
actually weaker than the trial court’s interest in controlling litigation
by, say, denying a continuance, the Court has never disclosed it.
The point is not that balancing is irrelevant, or in no way enhances the explanatory power of the leading theories. Rather, the
point is that, to transcend simplistic, ad hoc explanations, balancing—to borrow from Professor William Stuntz—“must reﬂect some
underlying theoretical structure.”36 Where, as here, the interests
on each side of the balance are neither trivial nor overwhelming,
“balancing without structure explains all results equally well; it is not
so much a positive theory as a confession that no positive theory
exists.”37 “The real challenge,” I agree with Stuntz, “is to explain why
the balances are struck as they are in particular cases, and to do so in
a way that allows one to assess, at least in broad terms, whether the
doctrine is internally coherent.”38 Proponents of the fairness and autonomy theories have produced no such explanation, and I am doubtful
that they can.
2. Fee forfeiture. A pair of fee-forfeiture cases the Court decided
in 1989 framed the issues it considered in Luis. In Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v United States,39 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
permits Congress to authorize postconviction forfeiture of so-called
“tainted” assets, traceable to criminal activity, even when the defendant seeks to spend the assets to pay the lawyers who defended him.40
The same thing goes, the Court said in United States v Monsanto,41
for a pretrial order freezing assets the government alleges are tainted
and therefore forfeitable.42

34
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 631 (1989). The plurality in
Luis characterized this governmental interest as lying fairly far from the “heart of a fair,
effective criminal justice system.” 136 S Ct at 1093 (Breyer, J) (plurality). Of course, the same
can be said, probably more strongly, of the government interests asserted in the prior cases.
35
On the forfeiture statute’s aims, see Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 833–34 (cited in
note 13).
36
37

Stuntz, 88 Colum L Rev at 1237 (cited in note 8).
Id (citation omitted).

38

Id.

39

491 US 617 (1989).
Id at 632–33.

40
41

491 US 600 (1989).

42

Id at 616.
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The Court’s reasoning went like this: (1) tainted assets, though in
the defendant’s possession, are “not rightfully his,” and (2) the defendant has “no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are
the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney
of his choice.”43 Put another way, “impecunious defendants have
[no] Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel,” and a defendant whose assets are tainted properly counts as “impecunious.”44
Any tainted assets, it bears noting, will not be proven forfeitable
until conviction, by which time the defense attorneys, having rendered services, will have established an interest in them. Yet through
a statutory relation-back provision, title in the tainted assets vests
in the United States at the time of the criminal act triggering forfeiture, giving the government a claim to the assets superior to the
lawyers’.45 And the pretrial order in Monsanto—entered, of course,
long before conviction—is analogous to pretrial detention of the defendant himself. It is, in other words, a restraint on the defendant’s
property “to protect its ‘appearance’ at trial and protect the community’s interest in full recovery of any ill-gotten gains.”46
It seems uncontroversial to say that the restraint of assets with
which a criminal defendant wishes to pay his attorney intrudes on the
fairness and autonomy interests the right to counsel of choice is
said to protect. Rendered indigent, or at least less wealthy, the defendant may be forced to proceed with less-qualiﬁed counsel and
fewer total defense resources, weakening his ability to compete with
the prosecution in an adversarial setting and depriving him of some
control over his own defense. If the fairness and autonomy theories
are to explain these cases, therefore, it must be because the “strong
governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets” outweighs the defendants’ interests.47 And indeed, considered
in isolation, this does not seem like a far-fetched proposition. The
principal difﬁculty is how to reconcile these earlier cases with the defendant’s victory in Luis. Neither the fairness nor the autonomy theory explains why the Court reached the opposite result in that case.
43

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 626.

44

Id at 624.
Id at 626–28.

45
46

Monsanto, 491 US at 615–16.

47

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 631.
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The key distinction between Monsanto and Luis—to focus on the
closest cousins—is that Monsanto involved the restraint of allegedly
tainted assets, but in Luis the money was concededly clean.48 How
does that affect the Sixth Amendment analysis under the fairness
and autonomy theories? As an initial matter, whether the assets are
tainted does not affect the defendant’s fairness and autonomy interests. Her interests in controlling her defense and obtaining a fair
adjudication are the same regardless of what kind of money she seeks
to spend. The explanation, if there is one, must instead be that the
government’s argument for recovering tainted assets is stronger than
for untainted assets. The Luis plurality can be read to take this position. Its formalistic reasoning, however, is unpersuasive—at least to
one in search of a functional theory.
The plurality characterized the distinction between tainted and
untainted assets as “the difference between what is yours and what
is mine.”49 Under the statutory relation-back provision, the plurality reminded, title to tainted assets passes to the government at the
time the crime is committed.50 The same is not true, it implied,51 of
untainted assets: “regarding her untainted assets,” the defendant can,
before trial, “reasonably claim that the property is still ‘mine,’ free
and clear.”52 This move allowed the plurality to characterize the government’s interest in “obtaining payment of a criminal forfeiture or
restitution order” using untainted assets as “contingent,” lacking in
“constitutional protection,” and, compared to the right to counsel of
choice, “further from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice
system.”53
The distinction between tainted and untainted assets cannot bear
the weight the plurality puts upon it.54 First, while it is true that the
government does not own forfeitable untainted assets before con48
The government went after the defendant’s “substitute” assets in Luis because, it alleged,
the defendant had already spent the proceeds of her crime—the kind of “tainted” assets held
forfeitable in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto. See Luis, 136 S Ct at 1087–88 (Breyer, J )
(plurality).
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id at 1091.
Id at 1092, citing 21 USC § 853(c).
But see, for example, United States v McHan, 345 F3d 262, 270–72 (4th Cir 2003).
Luis, 136 S Ct at 1092 (Breyer, J) (plurality).
Id at 1093.

This is not to deny that the distinction mattered at common law, or that it retains signiﬁcance in certain legal contexts today.
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viction, the same is true of forfeitable tainted assets. What the Court
consistently calls “tainted” assets are, after all, only allegedly tainted
assets.55 Until conviction, “[t]he defendant maintains ownership of
either type, with the Government holding only a contingent interest.”56 What made the pretrial order constitutionally permissible in
Monsanto is that the defendant’s assets were (prima facie) forfeitable,
not that they were tainted.57 The assets in that case happened to be
forfeitable because they were tainted, but that does not mean that
assets Congress deems forfeitable for some other reason—such as
to substitute for tainted assets already dissipated—are of a different
constitutional order.
Put another way, to say the government can freeze tainted but not
untainted assets is to beg the question. The purpose of the trial—in
either case—is to determine whether the assets are the defendant’s or
are instead forfeitable because the defendant committed a crime. Before trial, when the assets are restrained, the answer to this question
is unknown. The reason the Monsanto Court thought tainted assets
aren’t “the defendant’s” up until conviction was simply that Congress
said so—Congress said they could be frozen upon a showing of
probable cause.58 Congress said the exact same thing here, with respect to untainted, substitute assets.59
Second, the relation-back doctrine—which the Luis plurality
seemed to think applies to tainted but not untainted assets—is beside
the point. “The doctrine’s purpose is to prevent defendants from
avoiding forfeiture by transferring their property to third parties”;
it does not, however, “alter the time at which title to forfeitable
property passes to the Government.”60 Nor is it clear why Congress’s
statutory treatment of property is relevant to a Sixth Amendment

55
See id at 1112 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (“[T]he plurality’s use of the word ‘tainted,’ to describe assets at the pre-conviction stage, makes an unwarranted assumption about the defendant’s guilt. Because the Government has not yet shown that the defendant committed the
crime charged, it also has not shown that allegedly tainted assets are actually so.”) (citation
omitted).
56
Id; id at 1106–07 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
57
See Monsanto, 491 US at 615; United States v Wingerter, 369 F Supp 2d 799, 810 (ED Va
2005).
58
Monsanto, 491 US at 611–14, discussing 21 USC § 853(e).
59
60

See Luis, 136 S Ct at 1108 (Kennedy, J, dissenting), discussing 18 USC § 1345.

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1107 (Kennedy, J, dissenting). See also Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at
835 (cited in note 13) (discussing legislative history).
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analysis. If relation-back applies only to tainted assets, that fact is
simply a matter of “congressional whim[ ].”61 It is hard to imagine
that, if Congress extended relation-back to untainted, substitute assets, the plurality would change its tune. But that is what the logic of
its analysis implies.
Finally, because money is fungible, “the plurality’s approach leads
to utterly arbitrary distinctions as among criminal defendants who
are in fact guilty.”62 To borrow an example from Justice Kennedy’s
dissent, imagine a thief who steals $1 million and wins another
$1 million in a lottery. If he spends his lottery winnings on fancy cars
and meals, and then needs money for defense counsel, he’s out of
luck; the government can restrain the stolen funds. But if he spends
the stolen money ﬁrst, he can use the lottery winnings to pay an
attorney.63 This is senseless: “the Government’s and the defendant’s
respective legal interests” in the two pots of money—tainted and
untainted—“are exactly the same.”64
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, I should add, fares no better. Thomas argued, essentially, that the original understanding of
the Counsel Clause protects the defendant’s right to spend his money
to employ a defense attorney; that that right necessarily implies some
limit on the government’s ability to restrain the defendant’s assets
before trial; and that the common-law practice permitting pretrial
restraint of tainted but not untainted assets supplies that necessary
limit.65
There are several problems with Justice Thomas’s position for my
purposes. First, Thomas expressly eschews any interest in an analysis
that demands functional reasons for the distinctions it draws.66 Historical practice is Thomas’s lodestone, however much (or little) sense
it makes. Second, it is far from clear that Justice Thomas advances
a theory of the Sixth Amendment at all, as opposed to a theory about
the due process prerequisites to the restraint of any individual’s untainted assets. Thomas argues that a defendant’s untainted assets

61

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1108 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

62

Id at 1113 (Kagan, J, dissenting), citing id at 1108–09 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

63

Id at 1103 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Id at 1112 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

64
65

Id at 1096–97 ( Thomas, J, concurring in judgment).

66

Id at 1101.
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may not be restrained before trial whether he wishes to spend them
on a defense attorney or something else entirely.67 This suggests that
the Sixth Amendment itself is actually doing precious little work.
Finally, even if historical practice does adequately reconcile Luis
with the prior forfeiture cases, Justice Thomas makes no attempt to
show that it also explains the Court’s other counsel-of-choice precedents, declining to engage that body of law at all. As I acknowledged at the outset, it remains theoretically possible that all of the
Court’s decisions happen to align with historical understandings,
but I am doubtful, and neither the Court nor commentators have
done the work to prove it.
∗ ∗ ∗
In sum, because the defendant’s interest in counsel of choice is the
same regardless whether he wishes to pay his attorney with tainted or
untainted assets, the fairness and autonomy theories can explain the
forfeiture cases only if the government’s side of the balance is weightier in the former case than in the latter. There is, however, no good
functional account of why that would be so. The forfeiture cases thus
detract signiﬁcantly from the explanatory power of these leading
theories of the right.
3. Indigence. The notion that indigent criminal defendants might
retain a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice has been, to the
Court, a nonstarter.68 “It is hornbook law,” one commentator wrote,
“that indigent defendants have no right to counsel of choice.”69 If
the dominant theories are correct, this must be because (for reasons
absent in Luis) assigning counsel to these defendants is not unfair,
does not intrude on autonomy interests, or is justiﬁed by overriding
governmental interests—or some combination of the three. All of
these arguments, however, are weaker than they may at ﬁrst seem. I
address each one in turn.

67

Id at 1099.

68

See, for example, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US at 151 (“[T]he right to counsel of choice does
not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”); Caplin & Drysdale,
491 US at 624 (“Petitioner does not, nor could it defensibly do so, assert that impecunious
defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel.”); Wheat, 486 US at 159
(“[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford. . . .); Slappy,
461 US at 23 n 5 (Brennan, J, concurring in result) (calling the defendant’s “right to choose
his own counsel” a “right that indigent defendants do not enjoy”).
69
Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead
End?, 86 Colum L Rev 9, 49 n 207 (1986).
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a) Fairness.—Consider what would have happened to the defendant in Luis had the Court ruled against her and deemed her untainted assets unavailable to pay counsel. There is no suggestion that
she would have been forced through trial unaided by “the guiding
hand of counsel.”70 Of course not. Instead, the court would have
appointed an attorney to represent her—either a public defender or
a private attorney funded under the Criminal Justice Act.71 Such an
appointment could have threatened to injure the defendant (under
a fairness theory) only if there were an unacceptable risk that appointed counsel would fail to provide the effective assistance of
counsel necessary to make the trial fair.
One of two conclusions follows. First, it may be that forcing the
defendant to proceed with appointed counsel would not have jeopardized her right to a fair trial, and thus should not have been deemed
to violate her right to counsel of choice. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly rejected any presumption that appointed counsel are categorically ineffective or less effective than retained counsel.72 Effectiveness must be judged, the Court has instructed, after the fact, on a
case-by-case basis.73
As an empirical matter, this is not an unreasonable conclusion.
One federal government study, for example, found that conviction
rates and average sentences were similar for defendants represented
by publicly ﬁnanced and private attorneys.74 And federal judges rate
public defenders as superior to (and court-appointed counsel as equal
70

Powell, 287 US at 69.

71

See 18 USC § 3006A.

See, for example, Cronic, 466 US at 658 (holding, in a case of appointed counsel, that “we
presume that the lawyer is competent to provide the guiding hand that the defendant needs”);
Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335, 344 (1980) (“We may assume with conﬁdence that most
counsel, whether retained or appointed, will protect the rights of an accused.”).
72

73
See, for example, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984); Cronic, 466 US at 666. But
see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 Minn L
Rev 1197, 1216–20 (2013) (discussing preconviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).
74
Caroline Wolf Harlow, Special Report: Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases ∗1 (US Dept of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nov 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/8XRU-48RX.
See also Richard D. Hartley, Holly Ventura Miller, and Cassia Spohn, Do You Get What You
Pay For? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal Court Outcomes, 38 J Crim Just 1063, 1067
(2010) (determining, based on data from Cook County, Illinois, that type of counsel—public
defender versus private attorney—has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the court’s decision to incarcerate or the defendant’s sentence length). For a helpful review of the literature
comparing outcomes among different criminal attorney types, as well as an original analysis,
see Thomas H. Cohen, Who Is Better at Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense Attorney
Matter in Terms of Producing Favorable Case Outcomes?, 25 Crim Just Pol Rev 29, 32–33 (2014).
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to) private criminal defense lawyers.75 But such a conclusion—that
public and private attorneys are equally effective—would mean that
the fairness theory fails to explain the Luis decision.
There is, however, an alternate conclusion one might draw. Perhaps forcing the defendant in Luis to use a public attorney would
indeed have exposed her to an unacceptable risk of deﬁcient representation and jeopardized her fair-trial right. After all, crushing resource constraints plague public defense nationwide.76 Appointed
counsel often work under conditions no paying client would tolerate, and ethical rules discourage.77 Some data suggest that results may
suffer.78 The Court in Luis, on this assumption, narrowly rescued
the defendant from “injury by public defender.”79
On this view, the outcome in Luis was correct. But consider the
implications. Appointed counsel is the norm, not the exception, in
criminal defense. Roughly 80 percent of all criminal defendants—
and probably a higher share of capital defendants—rely on courtappointed lawyers to defend them.80 If forcing the defendant in
75
See Richard A. Posner and Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 Stan L Rev 317, 319, 325–26 & nn 30–31 (2011).
76
See, for example, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to
Counsel ∗50 (The Constitution Project, National Right to Counsel Committee, Apr 2009),
archived at https://perma.cc/N33T-L95J.
77
See Donald J. Farole Jr. and Lynn Langton, Special Report: County-Based and Local Public
Defender Ofﬁces, 2007 ∗1 (US Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sept 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/6X3B-6QYD (“About three-quarters (73%) of county-based public
defender ofﬁces exceeded the maximum recommended limit of cases received per attorney in
2007.”). See also Preeti Lala, Notes from the Field: Challenges of Indigent Criminal Defense, 12 NY
City L Rev 203, 224–26 (2008).
78
See Harlow, Special Report at ∗1 (cited in note 74) (reporting that, “of those found guilty,
higher percentages of defendants with publicly ﬁnanced counsel were sentenced to incarceration”); Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd, An Empirical Study
of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 Ohio St J Crim L
223 (2005) (ﬁnding, based on Colorado data, that public defenders achieved poorer outcomes
than their privately retained counterparts); Marian R. Williams, The Effectiveness of Public
Defenders in Four Florida Counties, 41 J Crim Just 205, 211 (2013) (demonstrating that, even
with an “above-average public defender system,” private attorneys in Florida obtain better
outcomes than public defenders), citing Marian R. Williams, A Comparison of Sentencing Outcomes for Defendants with Public Defenders versus Retained Counsel in a Florida Circuit Court, 23 Just
Sys J 249 (2002).
79
Consider Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 Harv L Rev 924 (2000).
80
See Harlow, Special Report at ∗1 (cited in note 74); Slamming the Courthouse Doors: Denial
of Access to Justice and Remedy in America ∗7 (ACLU, Dec 2010), archived at https://perma.cc
/G5B7-6TWL (“With rare exceptions, defendants facing capital charges cannot afford a
lawyer, and therefore rely on the state to appoint an attorney to provide an adequate defense.”).
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Luis to rely on a public defender would have been unfair, then what of
all these other defendants? To explain Luis on a fairness theory, in
other words, is to destabilize the whole regime of indigent defense,
cracking the very foundation of our contemporary criminal justice
system.81
The Court can’t have it both ways. Either appointed counsel are
presumptively effective notwithstanding the constraints under which
they operate—in which case the fairness theory cannot explain the
outcome in Luis—or they’re not, in which case Luis is correct but
implicitly acknowledges a constitutional crisis.
b) Autonomy.—If the fairness theory fails to explain the outcome
in Luis, perhaps autonomy can fare better. The challenge here is to
explain why the assignment of counsel would violate the autonomy
interests of the defendant in Luis but not of the myriad indigent
defendants. This task is not as easy as it might ﬁrst seem. After all,
at the moment she needed to pay counsel, the defendant in Luis was
effectively indigent, her assets having been frozen.82 She prevailed
by persuading the Court to focus on an earlier time, immediately
before the asset freeze, when she still had cash to spend. Yet certainly
some other indigent defendants could also point to a previous moment at which they were not indigent, and to the intervening events
that led them into poverty. Why is this particular intervention—a
pretrial order freezing untainted assets—the only one thought to intrude impermissibly on the defendant’s autonomy interests?
The explanation must be that it matters why the defendant is indigent: In Luis, the government reached out and restrained the defendant’s money, whereas restraints on the typical indigent defendant’s ﬁnances (and thus his autonomy) are exogenously determined.
This explanation, though, however plausible on the surface, can be
sustained only by resort to notoriously slippery conceptual distinctions and arbitrary framing devices.
81
See Luis, 136 S Ct at 1110 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“Given the large volume of defendants in the criminal justice system who rely on public representation, it would be troubling
to suggest that a defendant who might be represented by a public defender will receive inadequate representation.”). Consider also Kaley v United States, 134 S Ct 1090, 1102 n 13
(2014) (observing that, if forcing defendants to proceed with appointed counsel—by freezing
their assets pretrial—jeopardizes the trial’s fairness, “the right way to start correcting the
problem is not” by according more procedural protections before the asset restraint, “but by
ensuring that the right to effective counsel is fully vindicated” by appointed counsel).
82
See Luis, 136 S Ct at 1110 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (describing the defendant as someone
who “simply cannot afford the legal team she desires”).

136

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2016

Consider ﬁrst some of the ways an indigent criminal defendant
may have ended up indigent. Perhaps he was born into poverty, his
employer paid him too little, or the bank foreclosed on his home. In
each instance, one might argue, some private party, not the government, bears responsibility. In Luis, by contrast, the government,
not any private actor, took the defendant’s money. But why look
at things this way? As an initial matter, if the defendant in Luis had
simply been wealthier—if she had had $100 million in her accounts
instead of $2 million—she could have afforded private counsel even
after the asset freeze.83 Why not attribute her inability to retain counsel to her (very relative) impecuniousness—which, of course, may
well have resulted from private action—rather than focus on the trial
court’s order?84
More fundamentally, the public/private distinction—which supplies the intuition that the government taking a defendant’s money
is different from a private party doing so—is, at least in contemporary society, a porous one. Our indigent defendant was born into
poverty partly because estate law allows wealthy individuals to bequeath their fortunes to heirs rather than redistributing them widely;
his wages were too low partly because labor and employment law
required no more; and he lost his home partly because ﬁnancial regulations permitted subprime lending to unqualiﬁed buyers. In a wellregulated society, in other words, private parties always act on the
permission or forbearance of the government; the government’s ﬁngerprints are everywhere.85
Still, one might respond, in none of these examples did the government actually do anything to the now-indigent defendant.86 The
grievance is that the government didn’t help him enough, or that it
83
See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 625 (“The forfeiture statute does not prevent a defendant who has nonforfeitable assets from retaining any attorney of his choosing.”).
84
Consider generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (1981) (arguing that answers to legal controversies in criminal law
often follow from nonrational, interpretive constructs that frame up the controversies out of
factual scenarios).
85
For arguments developing this “baselines” critique, see, for example, Louis Michael
Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief: Contemporary Constitutional Issues 49–71
(Oxford, 1996); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard, 1993).
86
Consider, for example, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v Brooks, 436 US 149, 160 n 10 (1978) (“It
would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous cases, the notion of state
action under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of
property law in a State, whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to ‘state action’ even
though no process or state ofﬁcials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.”).
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should have structured society differently. In Luis, by contrast, the
government’s involvement was not limited to framing the background conditions in which private parties compete for wealth. In
Luis, the government took the defendant’s money—it reached out
and literally “rendered [the defendant] indigent.”87 And while “a
State need not equalize economic conditions” among criminal defendants, prejudice “resulting from a money hurdle erected by a State”
is nonetheless unconstitutional.88
For essentially the same reasons that the public/private distinction falters in this context, though, this act/omission distinction fails
to hold up as well. It is wholly arbitrary to describe the government as having (passively) “allowed” wealthy individuals to bequeath
their wealth, having “allowed” private employers to pay low wages
or prohibit collective bargaining, or having “allowed” banks to issue
irresponsible loans. One could just as readily say that the government, having considered the alternatives, selected (i.e., acted to adopt)
rules that favored powerful testators, employers, and banks.89 So the
government may have “acted” in Luis in a way that reduced the defendant’s wealth, but the same can be said in the case of many indigent defendants.90
The conceptual problems don’t stop there. Suppose we put these
academic quibbles to the side and posit that the government really
did, in some meaningful sense, take the defendant’s money in Luis.
One might be tempted to respond, “What else is new?” The government takes money from individuals all the time, without regard
for whether they’re facing criminal charges, and it’s never thought
to raise a Sixth Amendment issue. Taxation is only the most salient example. All sorts of agencies—say, the Securities and Exchange
Commission or Customs and Border Protection—are empowered
to restrain assets in pursuit of their regulatory objectives. They can
87

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1095 (Breyer, J) (plurality).

88

Grifﬁn v Illinois, 351 US 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J, concurring in judgment).

89

There are numerous sophisticated critiques of the act/omission distinction with respect
to the government. See, for example, Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
Mich L Rev 2271, 2312–13 (1990); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Afﬁrmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 Mich L Rev 345, 372–77 (2014); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev 935, 968 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein
and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life
Tradeoffs, 58 Stan L Rev 703, 719–28 (2005).
90
See United States v Brodson, 241 F2d 107, 111 (7th Cir 1957) (“[T]he manner in which
the defendant is rendered indigent is immaterial.”).

138

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2016

also ﬁle civil suit, creating obligations to pay judgments or settlements.91 Any of these could be the cause-in-fact of a criminal defendant’s indigence. How do we know which government moneyseizures matter for Sixth Amendment purposes?
There has to be some theory akin to proximate cause to sort the
constitutionally relevant causes from the irrelevant ones. Yet proximate cause itself is famously circular—there is no reliable way to
decide, in a nonarbitrary fashion, which causes are proximate.92 Temporal proximity doesn’t work. True, the government froze the defendant’s assets in Luis the same day it ﬁled criminal charges.93 But a
large tax bill might have come due the following day,94 or the IRS might
have ﬁled a jeopardy assessment to restrain the very same assets.95
Neither of these occurrences would have sounded Sixth Amendment alarms.96 And even if the asset freeze were the closest-in-time
occurrence, money is constantly ﬂowing between the government
and would-be defendants’ hands. Why focus only on the very last
exchange rather than letting the government offset the money it
froze by pointing to beneﬁts it had conferred upon the defendant,
say in the recent past?97
Nor does it help to point out that a pretrial asset freeze, unlike
the tax examples, is internal to the criminal justice system. For one
91
See Kathleen F. Brickey, Attorneys’ Fee Forfeitures: On Deﬁning “What” and “When” and
Distinguishing “Ought” from “Is,” 36 Emory L J 761, 769–72 (1987) (giving these and other
examples).
92
See Kelman, 33 Stan L Rev at 642 n 126 (cited in note 84) (“The logic [of proximate
cause] says a defendant must cause a harm to be justly punished, and a defendant causes a
harm when it is not so accidental as to make it unjust to punish him.”). See also Daryl J.
Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311, 1373 (2002) (“Absent
some explanation of why proximate harms and beneﬁts are especially relevant to one another,
nexus and germaneness limitations . . . seem to be recommended by little more than the
understanding that constitutional law is impossible if transactional frames may be expanded
indeﬁnitely.”).
93
Luis, 136 S Ct at 1104 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
94
See 26 USC § 6851, setting forth a “termination of taxable year” procedure that allows
the IRS to demand immediate payment of taxes and levy property under certain conditions.
95
See 26 USC § 6861, establishing a “jeopardy assessment” procedure that permits the
IRS, in certain circumstances, to assess a tax immediately, creating a lien on the taxpayer’s
property and allowing the IRS to levy summarily upon it.
96
See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 631–32 & n 8 (citing cases upholding jeopardy assessments “against constitutional attack” and observing that “[c]riminal defendants [ ] are not
exempted from federal, state, and local taxation simply because these ﬁnancial levies may
deprive them of resources that could be used to hire an attorney”); Kathleen F. Brickey,
Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72
U Va L Rev 493, 526–27 (1986) (collecting cases).
97

See Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1337 (cited in note 92).
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thing, as a formal matter, that’s not necessarily true—the government obtained the pretrial order in Luis in a separate, civil case, not
in the criminal case.98 But that aside, no one would think collection
of a ﬁne imposed in an unrelated criminal matter would violate a defendant’s right to counsel of choice in a new prosecution. A transactional approach also fails. What if the government had sued the
defendant civilly for the very same set of business transactions in
Luis—would the Sixth Amendment block it from collecting on a resulting judgment? I doubt it.
For similar reasons, the distinction between direct and incidental
burdens on the right to counsel of choice—most familiar from First
Amendment jurisprudence, which typically directs closer judicial scrutiny to the former than the latter99—does not help to identify Sixth
Amendment violations, at least without substantially more theorization.100 For one thing, it can be awfully difﬁcult to tell the difference—
indeed, the Justices disagreed in Luis itself about whether the trial
court’s order directly or only incidentally burdened the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment interests.101 It is also not clear that direct burdens
always raise the same degree of suspicion under the Sixth Amendment
as under the First, at least if I am correct that the Sixth Amendment
would not block the government from collecting on a judgment
awarded against a criminal defendant in a related civil case.102

98
99

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1104 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 105–14 (1987).

100
There is reason to question whether the distinction between direct and incidental
burdens on constitutional rights translates straightforwardly from the context of “primary
conduct rights” (like free speech) to “litigation rights” (like the right to counsel of choice), see
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv L Rev 1175, 1246–51
(1996); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan L Rev 235,
265–66 (1994), or even from one right to another within each of these categories, see Joseph
Blocher and Darrell A. H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and
the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U Chi L Rev 295 (2016) (developing a framework
speciﬁcally to evaluate incidental burdens on Second Amendment rights).
101
Contrast Luis, 136 S Ct at 1102 (Thomas, J, concurring in judgment) (“The asset freeze
here is not merely an incidental burden on the right to counsel of choice; it targets a defendant’s assets, which are necessary to exercise that right, simply to secure forfeiture upon
conviction.”), with id at 1105 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“To be sure, a pretrial restraint may
make it difﬁcult for a defendant to secure counsel who insists that high defense costs be paid
in advance. That difﬁculty, however, does not result in a Sixth Amendment violation any
more than high taxes or other government exactions that impose a similar burden.”).
102
Some have argued that, when it restrains a defendant’s assets pretrial, the government acts
with the impermissible purpose of disabling the defense. See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, 491
US at 635 (Blackmun, J, dissenting) (“[I]t is unseemly and unjust for the Government to beggar
those it prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial.”). This accusation seems unwarranted in general; Congress likely did not legislate with this agenda in mind. See Winick, 43 U
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Only, then, by relying on multiple, dubious conceptual distinctions and arbitrary framing choices can we explain why freezing the
defendant’s assets in Luis and forcing her to accept appointed counsel would violate her autonomy interests, yet foisting appointed counsel on an indigent criminal defendant leaves his autonomy undisturbed. And if we cannot explain that, then autonomy fails as a general
descriptive theory of the right to counsel of choice.
To venture normative brieﬂy, it is worth observing that, in addition to courting incoherence, distinguishing Luis from the indigence
cases on autonomy grounds requires a deeply conservative view of
the Sixth Amendment’s protections. The position entrenches the
status quo by shielding (untainted) assets the defendant possesses
immediately before the government moves on them, without regard
for how or why the defendant has those assets, while offering no
solicitude to the defendant who is indigent when ﬁrst pursued, without regard for how or why he lacks the assets his wealthier counterpart possesses. It distributes autonomy unequally according to
wealth, and regards that wealth as natural rather than as what it is—
the product of a lifetime of give-and-take between the individual and
his government as well as other private actors on terms the government sets.103
c) Countervailing interests.—Many readers, I suspect, will at this
point have the impulse to explain the indigence cases by pointing
to the government’s strong, systemic, countervailing interests. To be
sure, the argument goes, choosing lawyers for indigent defendants

Miami L Rev at 833–38 (cited in note 13) (reviewing statutory purposes). Still, the prosecutor in
a particular case may indeed act with this purpose by, say, targeting for restraint the assets of
defendants who retain certain disfavored defense attorneys. See Morgan Cloud, Government
Intrusions into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power
in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 Emory L J 817, 829–30 (1987). My tentative view is
that such targeting may be prosecutorial misconduct, but that it does not affect the Sixth
Amendment calculus under the dominant theories, as any infringement on the defendant’s
fairness or autonomy interests is the same regardless of the prosecutor’s purpose. Consider, for
example, United States v Marshall, 526 F2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir 1975) (rejecting, absent a
showing of prosecutorial misconduct, argument that alternative funds be made available when
the defendant’s assets were under a tax levy).
103
See Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1361 (cited in note 92) (describing wealth as “largely
dependent on a network of government subsidies and structures ranging from corporate law
to government-supported property rights”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory
Justice, in John W. Chapman, ed, Nomos XXXIII: Compensatory Justice 281, 286, 294, 298–99
(NYU, 1991).
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intrudes on those defendants’ fairness and autonomy interests, just as
in Luis. But it’s the only way to run the system. If we let indigent
defendants pick, they’ll all want Johnnie Cochran. He couldn’t possibly take on all that work (even were he alive) and, even if he could, it
seems terribly unfair to punish his success with appointed counsel’s
wages (and implausible for the state to pay his regular rate). The indigence cases, on this view, simply bow to practicality. Fairness and
autonomy interests are indeed at stake, but they’re overcome by administrative realities.104
There is a doctrinal clue supporting this explanation: while indigent defendants do not enjoy the right to counsel of choice, they do
retain various fair-trial protections as well as other aspects of the right
to control their defense. Indigent defendants, like all others, have the
right to effective assistance of counsel, a fair judge, and a prosecutor
who toes the line.105 “It is also recognized that the accused has the
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding
the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her
own behalf, or take an appeal.”106 The point is that granting indigent
defendants these rights furthers the same fairness and autonomy objectives thought to motivate the right to counsel of choice but without the concomitant disruption. This suggests that concern about
that disruption indeed may have informed the Court’s decision to
withhold the counsel-of-choice right from indigent defendants.
The concern, however, is likely overblown. Effectuating an indigent defendant’s right to counsel of choice could mean something as
simple as letting him choose a public defender or panel attorney who
is available and willing to represent him—perhaps an attorney with
whom he is familiar from a prior case, or one a friend has recom-

104
See Slappy, 461 US at 23 n 5 (Brennan, J, concurring in result) (listing “the State’s
interest in economy and efﬁciency” as “considerations that may preclude recognition of an
indigent defendant’s right to choose his own counsel”); United States v Ely, 719 F2d 902, 905
(7th Cir 1983) (arguing that “indigent defendants cannot be allowed to paralyze the system
by all ﬂocking to one lawyer”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal
Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 Ohio St J Crim L 505, 528–29 (2015) (describing
cases “assuming that client choice would place unmanageable strains on the management of
the criminal docket”). Alternatively, one might argue that “indigent” merely describes the
class of individuals who cannot afford any lawyer, and whom the right to counsel of choice, if
formally accorded, would not beneﬁt in any way.
105
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686 (1984); Bracy v Gramley, 520 US 899, 904 –05
(1997); Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963).
106

Jones v Barnes, 463 US 745, 751 (1983).
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mended.107 The military, for example, affords an accused the right
to representation “by military counsel of his own selection if that
counsel is reasonably available.”108 England, Scotland, Wales, and
Ontario, Canada give indigent defendants the right to select their
attorney,109 and both the Judicial Conference of the United States
and the American Bar Association at one time suggested the same
domestically.110 Professors Stephen Schulhofer and David Friedman
have outlined the structure of a workable voucher system.111 In short,
to recognize the indigent defendant’s right to counsel of choice, the
government need not conscript the bar or foot the bill for Johnnie
Cochran.112 Administrative concerns, in other words, may explain
why the right to counsel of choice must be cabined for indigent defendants, but they cannot explain the current doctrine, which withholds that right altogether.
∗ ∗ ∗
107
See, for example, Slappy, 461 US at 22–23 & n 5 (Brennan, J, concurring in result)
(arguing that recognizing “an indigent defendant’s interest in continued representation by an
appointed attorney with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and conﬁdence” is not
impractical); Drumgo v Superior Court of Marin County, 506 P2d 1007, 1013–14 (Cal 1973) (in
bank) (Mosk dissenting) (contending that the state should minimize interference with the
defendant’s choice, particularly where the defendant desires qualiﬁed counsel who is ready
and willing to serve). For academic arguments supporting a right to counsel of choice for
indigent defendants, including refutation or accommodation of the government’s presumed
interests in efﬁcient administration of the justice system, see Hoeffel, 44 San Diego L Rev at
549 (cited in note 10); Holly, 64 Brooklyn L Rev at 205–17, 224 –29 (cited in note 13);
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal
Help, 55 Hastings L J 835, 918–19 (2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer and David D. Friedman,
Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty
and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 Am Crim L Rev 73 (1993); Peter W.
Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 Stan L Rev 73, 80–84, 89–97
(1974); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black
Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 Law & Ineq 1,
48–51 (2002).
108
10 USC § 838(b)(3)(B).
109

See Schulhofer, 12 Ohio St J Crim L at 508 n 17 (cited in note 104) (collecting sources).

110

See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee to Review the Criminal Justice
Act, Interim Report (1992), reprinted in 51 Crim L Rep 2335, 2337 (1992); 1 ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services § 5-2.3 (2d ed 1980).
111
See Schulhofer and Friedman, 31 Am Crim L Rev at 112–22 (cited in note 107). See
also Norman Lefstein, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in Public Defense 241–49
(ABA, 2011). Inspired by Schulhofer and Friedman’s work, Comal County, Texas now
permits indigent defendants to choose the publicly funded attorney who will represent them.
Schulhofer, 12 Ohio St J Crim L at 509 (cited in note 104).
112
See Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 357 (1963) (“Absolute equality is not required;
lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them.”).
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Insurmountable problems plague the fairness and autonomy theories of the right to counsel of choice and, indeed, I suspect, any
theory of the right premised on individual interests. There is simply
too much doctrine that is irreconcilable with a model that straightforwardly balances individual against government interests. In the
next part, I offer a system-focused theory that, I argue, better explains the law.
II. The Antisocialization Alternative
I begin this part by describing the antisocialization theory
and showing how it explains the outcome in Luis. I then illustrate
how, unlike the fairness and autonomy theories, an antisocialization theory can also distinguish Luis from all of the prior decisions
in which the Court found no counsel-of-choice violation. I conclude
by sketching out a plausible normative case for the theory, though
I do not attempt a full-throated normative defense (nor am I sure I
would want to). Under the antisocialization theory I propose, the
right to counsel of choice is plausibly justiﬁed not by the advantages
it provides to the individuals who invoke it, but by the beneﬁts it
confers on other defendants.
a. illustrating the theory
An antisocialization theory conceives of the right to counsel of
choice not as a powerful individual protection but rather as a weak,
system-oriented safeguard against socialization of the criminal defense bar.113 On this view, only when the government advances a
theory for restricting the defendant’s right to counsel of choice that,
if accepted, would allow it to socialize criminal defense by shrinking
the private defense bar below some minimal threshold does the
counsel-of-choice right prevail over the government’s interest. Illustrating how the antisocialization principle can explain the outcome
in Luis will make the concept more concrete.

113
Consider Richard H. Fallon Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1777–91 (1991) (arguing that individual
remedies for rights violations are often, but not always, required, so long as the overall system
of remedies is “effective in maintaining a regime of lawful government”).
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The plurality’s opinion in Luis actually contains the seeds of an
antisocialization theory. The plurality observed, correctly, that a contrary outcome in the case would have “unleash[ed] a constitutional
principle that would have no obvious stopping place.”114 That principle would permit Congress to “write more statutes authorizing
pretrial restraints in cases involving other illegal behavior—after all,”
the plurality pointed out, “a broad range of such behavior can lead
to postconviction forfeiture of untainted assets.”115 And “[e]ven beyond the forfeiture itself, criminal ﬁnes can be high, and restitution
orders expensive.”116
The Luis plurality may, if anything, have undersold its point. For
one thing, Congress has already authorized pretrial restraints more
widely than the plurality’s language might be read to suggest; it has
also, as the plurality notes, widely permitted postconviction forfeiture of substitute assets.117 It’s only the combination of the two—
pretrial restraint of substitute assets—that remains rare. Congress
could change that with the ﬂick of a pen, adjusting a statutory crossreference or two. It need not “write more statutes,” as the plurality
suggested, only make the tiniest amendment to some existing ones.
The machinery is already in place—Congress just needs to power it
on. Restitution, moreover, is mandatory in a huge array of federal
cases, including both violent and property crimes.118 While the broad
federal restitution statute does not presently authorize pretrial restraint of assets, that, of course, is simply a matter of “congressional
whim[ ]” that could change at any moment.119 Indeed, both Houses
of Congress have considered bills that would amend the federal res-

114
Luis, 136 S Ct at 1094 (Breyer, J) (plurality). Justice Thomas, too, stressed this point. Id
at 1098 (Thomas, J, concurring in judgment).
115
116

Id at 1094 (Breyer, J) (plurality).
Id.

117
For example, the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) authorizes both pretrial restraint of tainted assets and postconviction forfeiture of substitute
assets. 18 USC § 1963(e), (m). So does the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC § 853(e), (p).
See also 18 USC § 982 (authorizing forfeiture for a large number of federal offenses and
incorporating the procedures in 21 USC § 853). Drug cases alone make up roughly a third of
the federal criminal docket. See US Sentencing Commission, Overview of Federal Criminal
Cases Fiscal Year 2015 ∗2 ( June 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/M2JX-3UQ9 (reporting
ﬁgure of 31.8 percent).
118

See 18 USC § 3663A.

119

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1108 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
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titution statute to do exactly that.120 Restitution is also mandated, or at
least authorized, in every state-court system.121 And all that’s before
we get to criminal ﬁnes.122
A contrary result in Luis would have allowed the government
(federal or state) to attach substantial monetary penalties to any offense—murder, arson, forgery, whatever—and then freeze pretrial
assets the defendant may need to pay those penalties. Indeed, given
how close we already are to such a regime (as just explained), a contrary result in Luis may well have encouraged this development.
One need not imagine improper legislative motives, I should add.
Particularly in an age of heightened, bipartisan awareness about the
ﬁnancial and social costs of mass incarceration, the increasing use of
monetary penalty schemes as a supplement to or substitute for imprisonment does not seem far-fetched.123 Such a development would
prevent the vast majority of defendants from retaining counsel and
make appointed counsel the norm in all but the most aberrant case
(e.g., the super-wealthy defendant). It exaggerates little, then, to conclude that a contrary outcome may have socialized the criminal defense bar.124 This is what it means to say that an antisocialization
theory explains the outcome in Luis.
120
Restitution for Crime Victims Act of 2007, S 973, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 22, 2007);
Restitution for Crime Victims Act of 2007, HR 4110, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 7, 2007).
121
US Dept of Justice, Ofﬁce for Victims of Crime, Legal Series Bulletin No. 6: Ordering
Restitution to the Crime Victim ∗1 (Nov 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/XJE4-MAPG.
122
Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Luis, argued that ﬁnes present a “separate and distinct”
issue from forfeiture, but did not explain why. Luis, 136 S Ct at 1108 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Indeed, at oral argument, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that, “if the government prevails in
this case, every State in the union, every locality could say that in the event of . . . any crime
involving a bodily injury, that the government is entitled to restrain disposition of assets that
might be used for medical care, for pain and suffering.” Transcript of Oral Argument at ∗32,
Luis v United States (US Nov 10, 2015) (No 14-419) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL
8491825). He added, in language resonant with an antisocialization theory, that “this would,
in effect, prevent the private bar from—from practicing law unless it does so on a contingent
basis.” Id at ∗32–33.
123
Indeed, aside from the judgment-proof problem, monetary penalties are economically
superior to incarceration as a mode of criminal punishment even when the economy is strong.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J Legal Stud 289, 293
(1983). See generally David Dagan and Steven Teles, Prison Break: Why Conservatives Turned
Against Mass Incarceration (Oxford, 2016).
124
Writing before Luis, one commentator criticized the Supreme Court’s fee-forfeiture
decisions for facilitating “socialization of the criminal defense bar.” See Matthew R. Lasky,
Comment, Imposing Indigence: Reclaiming the Qualiﬁed Right to Counsel of Choice in Criminal
Asset Forfeiture Cases, 104 J Crim L & Criminol 165, 180–82 (2014). My argument is that the
Court’s doctrine prevents socialization of the defense bar, a point that became clear only after
Luis.
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b. broader explanatory power
More important, unlike the fairness and autonomy theories, an
antisocialization theory explains what is unique about Luis; it distinguishes Luis from all of the cases before it. Consider ﬁrst the disputes concerning the trial court’s inherent powers to control litigation. Recall that the trial court has broad discretion to deny a
continuance, disqualify an attorney for conﬂict of interest (even in the
face of conﬂict waivers), and exclude nonlawyers, disbarred lawyers,
and out-of-state lawyers from practice—all regardless whether its decision has the effect of depriving the defendant of counsel of choice.
What explains these cases (juxtaposed with Luis) is not the relative
weakness of the defendant’s fairness or autonomy interests, or the
strength of the government’s need—it’s that these are one-off disputes. There’s no danger that trial courts will exercise their discretion under these precedents to suffocate the private defense bar. This
is because most prosecutions will not present the issues these precedents resolve, and because, even if they did, the trial court’s powers
enable it to preclude particular attorneys, one at a time, rather than
all attorneys the defendant might retain. Nor is there any way for the
legislature to amend the law, as it could under a contrary holding in
Luis, to give the government the opportunity to exploit the Court’s
holdings.
The same antisocialization principle explains the distinction between tainted and untainted assets the Court drew in Luis to distinguish Monsanto. The individual-rights theories failed to explain the
distinction because “the Government’s and the defendant’s respective legal interests in those two kinds of property, prior to a judgment
of guilt, are exactly the same.”125 Under an antisocialization theory,
the explanation is that limiting pretrial asset restraint to tainted assets prevents the government from restraining the defendant’s assets
in every case, and therefore ensures that some defendants will retain
the use of funds to spend on private counsel. The decision in Luis,
that is, has the rough-and-ready effect of cabining the government’s
use of pretrial asset restraint to the subset of crimes that generate
monetary proceeds.126 Only in these cases—not in most cases of
125
126

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1112 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
See id at 1113 (referring to the plurality’s “effort to cabin Monsanto”).
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murder, arson, and so forth—will there be any tainted assets to freeze.
And in this way, the doctrine guarantees the continued vitality of
the private criminal defense bar.127
Finally, the leading theories could not persuasively explain why
appointing counsel in Luis would have violated the defendant’s right
to counsel of choice, but assigning counsel for indigent defendants is
unobjectionable. The explanation under an antisocialization theory
is straightforward: denying indigent defendants the right to counsel
of choice will not starve the private criminal defense bar because
indigent defendants, by deﬁnition, lack the resources to pay a lawyer
and thus to support the bar. The doctrine upholds the right to counsel of choice only when doing so is necessary to prevent socialization
of the defense bar; affording the right to indigent defendants is, on
this view, a luxury, not a necessity.
c. normative plausibility
My argument has been that an antisocialization theory explains
counsel-of-choice doctrine and that the leading descriptive theories,
grounded in the individual defendant’s fairness and autonomy interests, do not. My aim is not to defend the antisocialization theory
as a normative matter, and I doubt that I would want to. It is, however, worth considering whether there is even a plausible normative
justiﬁcation for antisocialization, “for a theory that seems preposterous as a matter of policy or values does not explain persuasively—
at least not unless one assumes that those who make the law have
preposterous values or policy goals.”128
It’s not completely obvious that the answer is yes. Efforts to articulate the individualized harm that befalls a defendant who is denied the right to counsel of choice—the project of Part I—have failed.
And if we cannot articulate the harm, then why should we mind if

127
It is tempting to speculate that defendants charged with these money-making crimes are
the only ones with funds to spend on counsel; in other words, that the only defendants with
the ﬁnancial wherewithal to hire counsel are precisely the ones who’ll be disabled from
spending. The data, however, appear not to substantiate this supposition. See Harlow, Special
Report at ∗5 (cited in note 74) (reporting that in 1996 rates of appointed counsel were roughly
similar across different crime types, with those accused of public-order crimes hiring private
attorneys somewhat more frequently than defendants accused of violent, property, or drug
crimes).
128
Stuntz, 88 Colum L Rev at 1292 (cited in note 8).
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additional defendants—that last one out of every ﬁve—are also denied the choice?129
The plurality in Luis does offer one argument on this point. If the
government had its way, the plurality observes, all of the newly affected defendants—the defendants who could have afforded counsel
previously, but now cannot because the government has frozen their
substitute assets—would “fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and underpaid public defenders.”130 This would
“increas[e] the government-paid-defender workload” even further,
“render[ing] less effective the basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks
to protect.”131
The plurality’s basic position seems sound—the last thing publicly funded attorneys need is more work. But to make the plurality’s point more than merely rhetorical, and more than marginally
relevant to the constitutional calculus, everything must be just so:
(1) current resource constraints must not be so severe as to subject
indigent defendants to a present and undue risk of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the addition of a relatively small number of
newly impoverished defendants must then strain the indigent defense system to its breaking point; (3) indigent defense funding levels must not adjust upward in response; and (4) the Court must be
willing in the future (as it so far has not been) to hold that funding
deﬁciencies, if severe enough, can violate the Constitution. This
strikes me as a dubious set of assumptions.
A better justiﬁcation would identify reasons to resist socialized criminal defense even assuming the constitutional adequacy of governmentfunded counsel in a socialized world. If public defenders are good
enough for the indigent, in other words, are there nevertheless reasons not to have all defendants use them? Or, to frame the issue

129
Similarly, several commentators suggest that it would be dangerous if all criminal defense lawyers were (ﬁnancially) beholden to the government. See, for example, William J.
Genego, The Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees, 36 Emory L J 837,
852 (1987); David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 U Pa L Rev 1965, 1971
n 24 (1988); Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 779–80 & n 64 (cited in note 13). But if it is acceptable for the state to pay four of every ﬁve defense lawyers, what is the problem with
having it pay the ﬁfth? These commentators do not say. One possibility is that the private
defense bar serves as a bulwark against authoritarianism because it’s difﬁcult for the government to control—the government cannot, for example, condition its funding on acquiescence in regulation that dulls its power to challenge government action.
130

Luis, 136 S Ct at 1095 (Breyer, J) (plurality).

131

Id.
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slightly differently, does the existence of a private criminal defense
bar that services only one in ﬁve defendants beneﬁt the other four in
any way?132 Does privately funded criminal defense create positive
externalities?
There are several reasons to think the answer might be yes. I
should caution that my discussion of these reasons generalizes about
the qualities of the “public” and “private” defense bars. In fact, there
is wide variation in experience and skill within both bars alike. The
point here is only that some aspects of the private defense bar may
redound to the beneﬁt of at least some indigent defendants.
First, the existence of a private criminal defense bar may help attract legal talent to the ﬁeld. Many public defenders, to be sure, are
“cause lawyers” for whom law practice is not primarily an economic
enterprise. But some promising young lawyers may be more likely to
begin their careers in public defense if they know they can “cash
in” down the road at a job in the private defense bar.133 One com132
Consider the analogy to First Amendment overbreadth, discussed in Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L J 853, 867–70 (1991). Note that a contrary
result in Luis would not prevent volunteer counsel—from, say, a public interest organization
or law ﬁrm—from appearing on a defendant’s behalf. A system that precluded even volunteer
representation, by requiring defendants to proceed with the lawyer the court appointed to
their case, would raise additional difﬁculties. I will not discuss these problems except to
observe that history is replete with examples of locally disfavored defendants relying upon
out-of-town, volunteer counsel when local lawyers were too biased, or captured by local
interests, to represent them zealously. Powell v Alabama was such a case—after the defendants
were denied effective representation at trial, the International Labor Defense organization
volunteered to litigate the appeal. Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court
Confronts “Legal Lynchings,” in Carol S. Steiker, ed, Criminal Procedure Stories 4, 6–7 (Foundation, 2006). See also, for example, Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment 97 (Random House, 1973) (discussing NAACP involvement in Maxwell v Bishop, 398 US 262 (1970) (per curiam)). See generally David S. Mann, Not for Lucre or
Malice: The Southern Negro’s Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 64 Nw U L Rev 143, 147 (1969)
(asserting that “out-of-state attorneys participated in an average of 68.69% of the cases, federal
and state, involving civil rights and arising in the states of the Fifth Circuit from 1965 to
1968”). Consider also Sanders v Russell, 401 F2d 241 (5th Cir 1968) (invalidating federal district court’s restrictions on practice by out-of-state attorneys in civil rights cases).
133
See Matt Kaiser, 4 Ways to Break into White-Collar Criminal Defense Work (Above the
Law, Dec 5, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/N2VL-LKSN (advising young lawyers
seeking private, white-collar defense work to consider federal public defense as a stepping
stone); White Collar Defense/Internal Investigations (Ballard Spahr LLP), archived at https://
perma.cc/9JUC-QTUN (advertising “seasoned veterans” including “former public defenders”); Criminal Defense (Loyola U Chi Law Sch), archived at https://perma.cc/X6Z4-2E9K
(advising law students that “private defense attorneys . . . often gain experience in criminal
litigation by working as public defenders”). See also Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar
Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work 21–22 (Yale, 1985) (describing the high demand across
the country for white-collar defense attorneys, which initially targeted federal prosecutors
and, later, “a number of attorneys without prosecutorial experience who had worked with
leading litigators and received their basic training on the defense side”); William J. Genego,
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mentator claims exactly this effect: “If the ﬁnancial top of the criminal defense market is destroyed by fee forfeiture, fewer and less capable lawyers will enter the ﬁeld.”134 Eliminating the prospect of lucrative private defense work in the future may deter some “young
lawyers from working in the comparatively low paying public jobs in
state public defender . . . ofﬁces,”135 especially because these jobs,
unlike stints on the prosecutor’s side, are not reliable stepping-stones
to politics or private civil ﬁrms.
Second, and related, both human and knowledge capital may spill
over from the private to the public side. Many new attorneys—especially from elite law schools—head from law school to large law
ﬁrms, where they can sock away money and learn to practice criminal
defense “the right way,” typically in a corporate or white-collar setting. As these lawyers tire of law-ﬁrm practice, fail to make partner,
or simply desire a different course, some pursue careers in public
interest work, including public defense.136 These transitioning attorneys import into public defender ofﬁces the knowledge, skills, and
habits they acquired at the ﬁrm, and attempt to adapt them to the
constraints of their new practice. It is difﬁcult to tell how often this
happens, and it may be more common in some public-defense domains than others. But it’s not hard to ﬁnd examples.137
The New Adversary, 54 Brooklyn L Rev 781, 787 (1988) (asserting that “rich defendants” who
retain counsel affect “the criminal defense bar in general” by bringing “many new attorneys
and ﬁrms into the market place” who “compete on the basis of their reputations for vigorous
and successful defenses to government prosecutions”).
134
Winick, 43 U Miami L Rev at 782 (cited in note 13).
135

Id. See also Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys’ Fees: Applying an Institutional Role
Theory to Deﬁne Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis L Rev 1, 35 (arguing that, by
“driving [the most capable lawyers] from the market, the government would weaken the
collective strength of the defense bar” and skew “the balance of power in favor of the government in these—and perhaps most—criminal prosecutions”); Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete
and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 Harv L
Rev 670, 723 (1992) (discussing the “systemic interest in ensuring that skilled lawyers are
attracted to and remain in criminal defense practice,” which is disserved by permitting the
government to disable a defendant’s chosen counsel too readily).
136

Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L Rev 1, 102, 138 (2004) (describing how young lawyers “cycle through the private sector for a short stint in order to pay
off debt, build skills, or develop professional relationships,” and then “leave the ﬁrm, entering
other practice sites that provide more supportive environments for their commitments”);
Jane E. Tewksbury, The Changing Face of Public Sector Practice: Apprenticeships as a Recruitment
Tool, 40 Boston Bar J 12 (Nov–Dec 1996) (reporting that, due to downsizing and attorney
interest in work-life balance, “public sector agencies now ﬁnd that they are the beneﬁciaries
of an increasing number of applications from private sector attorneys with ﬁve to seven years
legal experience”).
137
See, for example, Parker Douglas and Megan Green, How I Got My Job as a Public
Defense Attorney (SJ Quinney College of Law, May 15, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc
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Similarly, well-funded private defense attorneys may develop novel
strategies or technologies that, after presentation in open court, publicly funded counsel can emulate. (Consider Barry Scheck’s inﬂuential cross-examination of the police ofﬁcer who headed evidence
collection as part of O. J. Simpson’s defense team, for example.138)
Innovation in defense strategy demands at least two ingredients. The
ﬁrst is the ﬂexibility to experiment.139 While socialization may cut
against experimentation, it’s not fatal—even in a “socialized” world,
our decentralized system of public defense permits variation across
public defender ofﬁces or among appointed counsel. But the second ingredient—resources—would undoubtedly dry up in a socialized system.140 The point is that, when wealthy defendants spend
huge sums to innovate, in some cases they produce public goods from
which indigent defendants also beneﬁt. Likewise, the private market likely breeds subject-matter experts who subsist primarily on high
fees from paying clients but who devote a small portion of their
practice to pro bono or reduced-rate work on behalf of indigent
defendants.
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(Bizzabo), archived at https://perma.cc/T52Z-2P37; Mark Drozdowski (Bizzabo), archived at
https://perma.cc/W74Q-XB3S; Michael Novara (Bizzabo), archived at https://perma.cc/3V5L
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(2015).
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Third, if we assume that law enforcement authorities regard private defense counsel as more formidable foes than publicly funded
lawyers—even maintaining the prior assumption that governmentpaid counsel are minimally adequate—then the existence of a private
defense bar may help deter the type of police and prosecutorial misconduct that defense lawyers frequently litigate.141 This would be
true to the extent that the authorities may be unsure, at the time the
misconduct would occur, which kind of lawyer they will face.
Finally, private defense counsel may affect the content of the law,
tending to push it in a defendant-friendly direction. The idea here
would be that superior resources enable private counsel to outperform government-paid lawyers in persuading courts that legal doctrine should accommodate defendants’ interests, or even just in persuading courts to rule for their clients in ways that end up beneﬁting
future defendants as legal authority.142
I have not proved these normative claims, or even close. One or
more of them might be wrong. But as a group, they strike me as
plausible enough to conclude that justifying the right to counsel of
choice on antisocialization grounds would not be “preposterous.”143
That is good enough not to disqualify antisocialization as a descriptive theory.
III. External Normative Complications
Scholarly analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of choice is largely critical. Motivating the criticism is a sense that the
Court has been getting the cases wrong. Until Luis, the Court consistently rejected defendants’ counsel-of-choice claims, even when
the balance of individual and government interests did not clearly

141
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favor the state.144 My claim is that the Court’s decisions are explicable upon the realization that the doctrine treats counsel of choice
not as an individual right at all, but instead as a system-level safeguard against a socialized criminal defense bar. Were I asked to predict the Court’s next counsel-of-choice decision, I would—on the
admittedly controversial assumption that most Justices, in most cases,
make some effort to decide disputes consistently with the pattern
of preceding decisions145—look to this explanation before the fairness and autonomy theories commentators have assumed the Court
has been ineptly attempting to implement. And were I to critique
the doctrine on normative grounds, I would consider whether antisocialization ought to delineate its bounds.
I want here, however, to turn to a different normative point: There
are reasonable arguments, based on separate constitutional principles, independent from the right to counsel of choice, that several of
the precedents discussed above are incorrect. The ﬁrst is Monsanto.
Justice Kagan, dissenting in Luis, characterized Monsanto as “a troubling decision,” and I agree.146 The reason is that, as Justice Kagan
points out, at the moment the government freezes the defendant’s
assets pretrial—based on a showing of probable cause to believe the
assets will be proved forfeitable—“the presumption of innocence
still applies.”147 And while it’s true, as the Monsanto Court reasoned,
that the government may sometimes restrain persons pretrial “where
there is a ﬁnding of probable cause to believe that the accused has
committed a serious offense,”148 the analogy is less persuasive than it
appears.
144
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First, while a criminal indictment may issue based on probable
cause, pretrial restraint of the accused “cannot be justiﬁed by the
fact of the indictment alone.”149 The government must also show,
by clear and convincing evidence at an adversarial hearing, that “no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person [for trial] and the safety of any other person
and the community.”150 Second, it would not be difﬁcult to ensure
that the defendant’s assets be used only for their intended purpose.
The assets could be placed in escrow and released to the defendant’s
attorney upon submission of a reasonable request for fees. Upon
resolution of the case, the balance would be returned to the defendant
or forfeited, as appropriate.151 Such an arrangement would advance
the legislative aims of punishing crime and disgorging its proceeds
but not the impermissible aim of hobbling the accused’s ability to
defend himself.152
Yet simply rolling back Monsanto may not be satisfactory either.
There is the nagging problem of the hypothetical robbery suspect,
ﬁrst raised by the Court in Caplin & Drysdale. “A robbery suspect,”
the Court there pointed out, “has no Sixth Amendment right to use
funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him
if he is apprehended. The money, though in his possession, is not
rightfully his,” the Court continued, and so “the Government does
not violate the Sixth Amendment if it seizes the robbery proceeds and
refuses to permit the defendant to use them to pay for his defense.”153
149
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One might respond, of course, that the robbery suspect is only
that—a suspect—and the funds he wishes to spend, only alleged robbery proceeds.154 It is not difﬁcult, though, to conjure factual scenarios in which this position would become untenable. To reach a
solution that accommodates not only the defendant’s right to counsel
of choice (whatever it means) and the government’s interest in forfeitable assets, but also the presumption of innocence, the Court
must surface all of these competing interests. It must resist the temptation to rely on a false binary in which money is either “stolen” or
wholly “innocent.” Probably some heightened burden of proof for
pretrial asset restraint, beyond probable cause, is in order.155
The second precedent—or principle, really—that appears to
contravene separate constitutional values, apart from what counselof-choice doctrine ought to require, is the principle that indigent
defendants enjoy no control whatsoever over who represents them
(apart from the option to eschew counsel altogether). Even when the
Constitution does not require the state to furnish criminal defendants
a particular right, when the state voluntarily undertakes to do so, the
Equal Protection Clause demands that it afford the right to wealthy
and poor alike.156 The mandate is not that all defendants be put on
equal footing, ignoring, for example, “the harsh reality that the quality
of a criminal defendant’s representation frequently may turn on his
ability to retain the best counsel money can buy.”157 The discriminatory effects of wealth disparities are not unconstitutional, in other
words. But “discrimination against ‘indigents’ by name” is another
matter.158
The principle denying indigent defendants any right to counsel
of choice is of this latter, more pernicious sort. The Court in these
cases does more than nod to the “harsh reality” that wealthy crim-
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inal defendants can afford fancier lawyers than poor ones. It withholds the right to counsel of choice from indigent defendants altogether. Perhaps the thinking is that affording indigent defendants
a say in the matter is impracticable. Yet there are ways to structure
the appointment of counsel, discussed above, that accommodate administrative realities while according indigent defendants a measure
of choice.159 This is an accommodation we ought to pursue and, indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to impel us to do so.160
∗ ∗ ∗
If one can say nothing else, it is that the right to counsel of
choice is grossly undertheorized, particularly for an entitlement said
to embody the “root meaning” of the “mo[st] essential” criminal
procedure right.161 Perhaps the Court’s decision in Luis deserves the
praise it has received.162 But it looks to me a lot like selective empathy
that is, at bottom, difﬁcult to justify by notions of individual desert.
Seeing the doctrine now for what it really does, we are positioned to
consider whether the right is best limited, as it is today, to effectuating system architecture, or whether it ought to be given wider compass to beneﬁt all defendants more directly.
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